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Abstract. A dynamics for frequency dependent selection is proposed and applied to several 
biological examples. The relation with game dynamics and evolutionary stability is analyzed. 
Game theory has been used successfully to model the evolution of biological traits whose 
advantage depends on their frequency in the population (see lvlaynard Smith [7]). The basic 
notion of evolutionary stability singles out solutions which, while safe from future change, 
need not be likely outcomes of past adaptations. The first to point this out was Eshel ([3], 
see also [4]). Recently, Taylor [ll] and Nowak [8] stressed the independence of (a) being 
able to resist any invasion and (b) being able to invade everything. In this note, we propose 
a dynamics to model the effect of adaptation, relate it with the stability of equilibria, and 
discuss some examples concerning, in particular, iterated interactions and gamete sizes. 
The phenotypic traits we consider are determined by conrinvovs variables (like size, sex 
ratio or the probability of some behaviour). We assume that the population is essentially 
monomorphic (all in some state x except for an occasional mutant in a near-by state 
y = x + h.) The fit ness of such an individual is denoted by A(y, x), its relative ad- 
vantage A(y, x) - A( x,x) by W(h,x). The state 2 is said to be evolutionarily stable, if 
A(y, 2) 5 A(ji,zZ) for all y, with A(?,y) > A(y, y) if A(y, 2) = A(?, a) for some y # 2. 
This implies that a population i cannot be invaded by a small population y. But it offers 
no argument for the establishment of 2. It can happen that an evolutionarily stable state 
f is a ‘garden of Eden’ configuration, i.e., without a supplanted predecessor: near-by states 
evolve away from it. Since a slight perturbation of the environment can make P lose its 
evolutionary stability, subsequent adaptations will lead it further astray. 
The proposed adaptive dynamics (first version) is 
a$ = -%YJ) 
aYi 
i = 1, . . . . n. 
y=X 
The rationale is that a few mutants y close to x test out alternatives, and that the whole 
population evolves in the direction of the most promising one. This is supposed to mimick 
an evolution favouring individual fitness. It can also be used for learning models, under the 
assumption that trials are myopic, i.e., explore only the vicinity of the current state. If A 
is frequency independent, i.e., depends only on y, we get the usual hill-climbing dynamics 
leading to local optimization. 
In the one-dimensional case, (1) is 
i = I. (2) 
Following Taylor [ll] ; a state i will be said to be b-stable if W(h,?) < 0 for all small 
h # 0, and x-stable if W(h,t) has the sign of h(2 - Z) for small h. Thus h-stability means 
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that 5 is a strict (local) Nash equilibrium, and hence locally evolutionarily stable, while 
x-stability means that if the population is in a state z close to i, then any mutations in the 
right direction (towsrds 5) will succeed. In each case, 3 is an equilibrium of (2). Generically, 
an equilibrium is x-stable iff & < 0 and h-stable iff G < 0. 
For example, if t is the sex-ratio, then A(y,z) = $ + e and hence (2) yields 
,.= l-2t 
z(1 - z) * 
The equilibrium 5 = 3 is both x-stable and evolutionarily stable, but only ‘weakly h- 
atable’ since W(h,i) = 0 for all h. Eshel [3] g ave some ingenious examples of equilibria 
which are h- but not x-stable. Taylor [ll] states that he has yet to see biologically plausible 
equilibria which are x- but not h-stable (or not evolutionarily stable). We believe that they 
can be found for iterated interactions. 
The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is a paradigm for the evolution of cooperation [2]. In 
each round of the interaction, the choice is between El (cooperation) and E2 (defection) 
and the payoff is given by the 2 x 2 matrix oij satisfying 
421 > 411 > 422 > 412 and 2Qll > 422 + 412. (3) 
Tit For Tat (start with EI, then do whatever the other did last) proved amazingly success- 
ful in computer tournaments. But in biological applications, there is always the probability 
of an error which turns a mistaken defection into the starting point of an expensive feud. 
In this context, it is interesting to study stochastic reactive strategies defined by the condi- 
tional probability zi to play El, given that the other’s last move was Ei. For simplicity, we 
consider the infinitely repeated case. The initial move, then, does not matter (but see [9] 
for the general situation). A simple computation yields 
A(y,X) = 5 aijcidj 
i,j =l 
with 
Cl = Yz + (Yl - Y2)22 t2 + (Xl - t2)y2 
1 - (Yl - Y2)(Zl - z2) 
dl = 
1 - (Yl - Yz)(+1 - t2) 
andcz=l-ci,dZ = 1 - dl. Hence (1) yields 
kl = (1 _ .;j;l+ T) F(+1,t2) i2 = (1 _yj;1’, T) F(z1, t2) 
with 
F(z1, t2) = 4z2(1+ y) + ((412 - 422) + (421 - 422)r) (1 - r) 
where 4 = 411 - 421 + a22 - 012 and P = z1 - z2. Now suppose there is no variation in 
12: it is fixed at some small value e (the probability of a mistake). If 4 < 0, there is a 
unique fi with F(fr,~) = 0. This ir is h- but not x-stable (see Fig. 1). On the other 
hand, if 21 = 1 - E is fixed at some value close to 1, there exists for 4 > 0 an & such that 
F(l - E, 4 = 0, which is x- but not h-stable (see Fig. 2). Is this biologically plausible? 
The fixation of 21 = 1 - E can be viewed as a consensus to cooperate as long as the other 
does. The evolutionary interesting variable is then the probability 1 - 22 to retaliate after 
a defection. It should offer no incentive for exploitation, but avoid needless recrimination 
after a mistake. 
A similar example holds for the repeated game of Chicken (or Hawk-Dove): E2 means 
now escalation of the fight, El avoidance of it. Instead of (3) one has 021 > all > ~12 > 422. 
Ifxr = E is fixed at some small value (if the adversary chickened out last time, one gets 
bold), the question is to find the right probability to escalate following an escalation of the 
adversary. It is given by the value 52 of F(e,S2) = 0. Again, iz is x-stable (the adaptive 
dynamics leads towards it), but not h-stable (see Fig. 3). 
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Let us consider now a sexually reproducing species with two mating types 1 and 2. A 
c 
Figure 3 
phenotype x corresponds to the choice of gamete weights xl and xz when of type 1 or 2. 
The number of gametes is inversely proportional to their weight. The survival probability 
V(m) of a zygote of mass m is increasing in m. Then, assuming sex ratio f and mass action, 
we get the payoff 
so that (1) becomes 
Xi = & V’(Xl +x2) - 
( 
w+1 + x2) 
> 
i= 1,2. 
Xi 
Since 
51 - 
k2 = 4V(Zl +x2) 
(x1x2>2 
(Xl -x2), 
we see that the flow points away from the (invariant) diagonal. The equilibria are on the 
diagonal (satisfying V(22r) = 5rV’(2il)). They are evolutionarily stable (uninvadable if 
one of the gamete sizes is fixed), if V”(2ir) < 0: but it is highly unlikely that evolution 
will be trapped at such a point. The adaptive dynamics leads to a dimorphism of gamete 
sizes (one mating type follows the nale strategy of producing many small gametes, the other 
mating type the female one). 
So far, we assumed that x varies in an open subset of R” equipped with the Euclidean 
metric: fluctuations in every directions are equally likely. It may happen that another metric 
is more appropriate, e.g., if the genetic or developmental constraints render variations in one 
direction more likely than in another. It may also happen that x is restricted to some subset 
of R”, for example to the simplex S,, , if the ti are probabilities of some strategies, summing 
up to 1. 
Again, in an adaptive dynamics, the prevalent state x of the population will tend in the 
direction of the maximal local increase of the fitness A(y,x), i.e., the y-gradient of A(y,x) 
at Y = x: i will be proportional to the unit vector < maximizing A(x + E<,x) - A(x,x), 
in the limit c - 0. Obviously, this notion of gradient, and therefore the adaptive dynamics 
associated with the fitness function A(y,x), depends on a Riemannian metric to be chosen 
on the state space. 
Let G be a general Riemannian metric which associates (in a smooth way) to each x a 
symmetric positive definite matrix G(x) = (gij(x)), such that the inner product at x is given 
((3 7)x = <=G(x)q = C gij (x)&vj* (4) 
ij 
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If the state space is (an open subset of) R”, then it is well-known that the G-gradient of 
a function V(x) is given by G(x)-’ grad V(x), where grad V(x) is the Euclidean gradient. 
From (4) and the definition of adaptive dynamics, we have 
(q,;C), = ~*G(x)k = CSij(X)?iij = DyA(YtX)ly=,(?) (5) 
for all 11. 
Let US now consider the most important special case where x E S,, and A is linear in y, 
i.e., 
A(Y,x) = yTf(X) = C Yifi(x)- (6) 
i 
Then (5) must hold for all 7 in the tangent space Rg, and we obtain 
c * 9ij+j = fi(X) + e(X) (7) 
for some function @ which is determined by the constraint Ci Xi = 0. If the matrix G is 
invertible, which can always be achieved by extending it in a positive definite way from R;f 
to R”, we can transform (7), i.e., GA = f + Qil, into 
j, = G-‘f(x) + g+(x), (5) 
with g = G-‘1, 1 denoting the n-vector of 1’s. Then l*? = C ii = 0 implies lTG-‘f + 
OITg = 0 or Q = e, where lTg = lTG”l > 0. Hence, (7) is equivalent to the explicit 
form 
Xi = CCij(x)fj(x) (9) 
j 
with 
C = G-i gg= 
---a* (10) 
It is not hard to see that C restricted to q is positive definite. Conversely, if C is a 
symmetric n x n matrix, with Cl = 0 and cTC,$ > 0 for [ E R$ \ {0}, then we can define G 
as a generalized inverse of C and thus obtain a Riemannian metric on S,, such that (9) is 
the corresponding adaptive dynamics. 
We illustrate this with two examples: a) Euclidean metric on S,,. Here gij(x) = 6ij, hence 
g = G”l= 1 and C = I - il P, i.e., cij = 6ij - i, so that the adaptive dynamics reads 
n 
iFi = fj(X)- 
iZf() k X * 
= 
b) The Shahsha!~ni metric [l] on Sn is defined by gij = &j&. Here g = G-‘1 = X, SO by 
(lo), Cij = XiCij - XiXj and the adaptive dynamics reads 
Xi = Xi(fi(x) - f(X)), &> = c Xkfk(X). 
k 
This is the replicator equation [S]. It is interesting to note that while the metric is defined 
only in int Sn, the dynamics extends continuously to the boundary, and leaves the boundary 
faces invariant. Hence this kind of adaptation does not lead to new strategies. 
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Let now 2 E int S,, be an ESS for the fitness function A(y, x) = y’f(x), then by Pohley 
and Thomas (lo] 
x’f(x) > x’f(x) for x near P, x # ji. (II) 
We claim that ji: is locally asymptotically stable for each adaptive dynamics (9). Let V(x) = 
(x - f, x - n), = (x - ?)=G(%)(x - a), an approximation for the geodesic distance of x to 
2. Then by (7) 
k(x) = 2(x - a)*G(a);c 5* 2(x - 5QTG(x)k 
= 2(x - ii)T(f(X) + 01) = 2(x - n)Tf(x) < 0. 
Hence, V is a local Ljapunov function, and f is asymptotically stable. Therefore, near 
an ESS, the geodesic distance between orbits decreases monotonically for each adaptive 
dynamics. In particular, for the replicator equation, the distance induced by the Shahshahani 
metric, i.e., the arccos distance [l, p. 391, tends monotonically to 0, near an ESS. Actually, 
at least for linear payoff functions f(x) = Ax, this gives a remarkable relation between the 
notion of ESS and the Shahshahani metric: P is an ESS, if and only if the geodesic distance 
decreases near f in the replicator equation. A related result of Hines [5] shows some other 
sort of converse: If ji: is stable for each adaptive dynamics (7), i.e., for each choice of C or 
G, then jz must (essentially) be an ESS. 
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